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We consider a voluntary contributions game, in which players may punish others after 
contributions are made and observed. The productivity of contributions, as captured in the 
marginal-per-capita return, differs among individuals, so that there are two types: high and 
low productivity. Every two or eight periods, depending on the treatment, individuals vote on 
a punishment regime, in which certain individuals are permitted, but not required, to have 
punishment directed toward them. The punishment system can condition on type and 
contribution history. The results indicate that the most effective regime, in terms of 
contributions and earnings, is one that allows punishment of low contributors only, regardless 
of productivity. Nevertheless, only a minority of sessions converge to this system, indicating a 
tendency for the voting process to lead to suboptimal institutional choice. 
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When a group or a society faces a social dilemma, a potential role for an institution to promote or 
enforce a cooperative norm arises. If such an institutional structure is not imposed exogenously, it 
must  arise  endogenously  from  a  social  choice  process  involving  the  affected  individuals.  In  a 
situation in which individuals are symmetric and their incentives to cooperate are perfectly aligned, 
one might argue that agreeing on a mechanism to enforce collective action might be relatively simple. 
The mechanism can require the individuals concerned to sacrifice an equal amount, all individuals 
can be punished similarly when deviating from appropriate behavior, and all individuals behaving 
appropriately can benefit equally.  
  On the other hand, suppose that players are heterogeneous. Then it is possible that the task of 
endogenously choosing an appropriate system to promote cooperation may be more difficult, and 
suboptimal institutions might emerge from the process. In this paper, we consider the effect that one 
type of heterogeneity among agents has on the institutions that emerge from a voting process. We 
employ an experimental approach. Our research strategy is the following. We take a setting, in which 
it is known from previous experimental results that effective institutions emerge from a simple voting 
process  when  individuals  are  symmetric. We  then  construct  an  experimental  environment  that  is 
identical, except for the fact that there are two types of individual that differ only in the externality 
generated from their contributions, and introduce an analogous voting process. We find that in the 
heterogeneous environment, poor institutions often emerge.  
       The environment that we consider is a version of a popular experimental paradigm to investigate 
social dilemmas, the voluntary contributions mechanism for public good provision. This is a game, in 
which  players  simultaneously  choose  a  fraction  of  their  endowment  to  contribute  toward  the 
provision of a public good. The level of contribution can be readily interpreted as a measure of 
cooperation. While total group payoff is increasing in the sum of members’ contributions, and the 
social optimum is reached only when all individuals contribute all of their endowment, the dominant 
strategy  for  each  player  is  to  contribute  zero.  One  focus  has  been  on  the  role  of  decentralized 
sanctions, the ability of individuals to punish others based on their level of cooperation (Yamagishi, 
1986; Ostrom et al., 1992; Fehr and Gächter, 2000, 2002; Masclet et al., 2003; Sefton et al., 2007). 
Such sanctions have been shown to be effective in increasing cooperation
1, but to have mixed effects 
on welfare (Bochet et al., 2006; Tan, 2008). 
                                                 
1  Two  of  the  limitations  that  apply  to  this  result  are  the  following.  The  first  is  that,  as  soon  as 
counterpunishment  is  allowed,  some  of  the  beneficial  effect  is  negated  (Denant-Boemont  et  al.,  2007; 
Nikiforakis, 2008). The second is that there is some tendency to punish cooperative players. This tendency has 
been termed anti-social or perverse punishment (Cinyabuguma et al., 2006), and the incidence of this behavior 
varies greatly depending on population studied (Herrmann et al, 2008).   In the studies listed above, the experimenter imposed the sanctioning institution exogenously. 
There has been recent interest in endogenous punishment institutions that the affected individuals 
select themselves. Gürerk et al. (2005, 2006) permit individual players to choose, at the beginning of 
each period, between membership in a group with, and one without, sanctioning opportunities. They 
find that, while the majority of players opt for the sanction-free institution in the initial periods, the 
entire population eventually migrates to the group in which sanctioning is permitted. Botelho et al. 
(2005) construct a 21-period game in which players can vote, by majority rule, whether to allow for 
punishment  in  the  last  period  after  experiencing  both  systems  with  and  without  sanctioning 
possibilities for ten periods each. They find a tendency for groups to vote for the system that yielded 
them  a higher payoff  previously.  In their study,  this  was  typically  an institution  that allowed no 
punishment. Sutter et al. (2006) let players decide whether to impose a punishment or reward regime 
at the beginning of a session, by unanimity, and find that individuals prefer rewards, even though 
payoffs are higher under punishment. Decker et al. (2008) allow individuals to vote for enforcement 
of  the  maximum,  median,  or  minimum  punishment  assigned  to  an  individual,  and  also  report  a 
tendency to vote for the particular institution that yielded the highest payoff previously.
  They find 
that the maximum rule is the most effective in generating high contributions. A number of studies find 
that contribution rates under mechanisms enacted endogenously by group members are higher than 
when the same institutions are imposed exogenously (Tyran and Feld, 2004; Kosfeld et al., 2008; Bó 
et al, 2007).
2   
  Ertan et al. (2009) is the study most closely related to ours. They study a setting, in which players 
vote at regular intervals, by majority, on whether to allow punishment of group members who have 
made  contributions  that  are  (a)  below-average,  (b)  above-average,  and  (c)  exactly  equal  to  the 
average for the group. If a punishment rule is passed, any group member may assign punishment to 
any individual meeting the criterion of the rule. The rules are not mutually exclusive: any, none, or all 
of punishment options (a) – (c) could be approved. They observe that most groups, while initially 
choosing not to allow any punishment at all, eventually vote to allow punishment of below-average 
contributors  exclusively.  A  minority  of  groups  ban  any  form  of  punishment  throughout  their 
interaction, and no groups ever vote to allow punishment of above-average contributors. Since both 
contributions and earnings are highest when individuals can be punished if and only if they contribute 
less than the  group average,  the  authors conclude that  groups  successfully  converge  to the  most 
                                                 
2 Two recent studies have the feature that the punishment institution voted into place only governs players who 
vote in favor of it. In Kroll et al. (2007), agents first play a voluntary contributions game for ten periods, and 
make and vote on non-binding proposals of minimum total contributions. They report that voting is an empty 
commitment unless punishment is used to enforce the outcome. Kosfeld et al. (2008) have a similar finding that 
as long as there is no provision of a binding commitment, cooperation itself is difficult to attain.  efficient institutional structure. The focus of our study here is to consider whether this ability of a 
voting process to converge to the optimal institutional structure is robust to a particular change in the 
environment. This change is the existence of heterogeneity in the value to the group of individuals’ 
contributions.  
  In all of the studies mentioned above, agents were homogenous in terms of the value that their 
contribution generated for the group, so that the tradeoff between the social benefit of cooperation 
and the private benefit of free riding was identical for each member of the group. In many situations, 
however,  heterogeneity  among  group  members  may  exist,  due  to  differing  productivity  of  their 
contributions. Consider, for example, a group of individuals that must complete a project for which 
all group members will receive equal credit. However, the effort of some group members, because of 
higher productivity in the required task, yields greater benefits for all than the same effort from other 
members. For example, one hour of work on the part of one individual may yield the same output as 
three hours of another individual’s work. Because all group members, including the contributor, reap 
the  benefits  of  an  individual’s  effort,  this  heterogeneity  in  productivity  is  equivalent  to  a 
heterogeneous cost of effort among individuals, with those with higher productivity also having lower 
unit opportunity cost of contribution.
3  Thus, the gains and costs of a contribution depend on who 
made the contribution. The  basic  incentive  structure  of this  situation  can  be captured  within the 
experimental paradigm described above if the marginal per-capita return of a contribution (MPCR) 
differs depending on who is making the contribution.
 4 
                                                 
3 Some experiments have distinguished between the private benefit to the individual making the contribution 
and the benefit of the contribution to other agents, calling these the internal and external returns, respectively. 
Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997), Brandts and Schram (2001) and Margreiter et al. (2005) vary the internal return, 
while holding constant the external return. In other words, contribution costs of players differ, but every group 
member benefits the same given a contributed token, regardless of the identity of the contributor. 
4 There are a few prior experiments in which MPCR differs among group members. Fisher et al. (1995) conduct 
a voluntary contributions game in which they assign half of the group members an MPCR of 0.75 and the other 
half  an  MPCR  of  0.3.  By  comparing  the  group  average  contributions  with  those  of  homogenous  groups 
featuring MPCR of 0.75 and 0.3, they conclude that the subjects seem to focus only on their own MPCR: 
players assigned 0.75 contribute more than those with 0.3. Reuben and Riedl (2009a) study a setting in which 
one player has an MPCR of 1.5, and thus a dominant strategy to contribute, and the others have an MPCR of 
0.5.
 They allow individuals to punish others after observing the contribution profile. They find that punishment 
is not as effective as in a control group where everyone is endowed with the same MPCR of 0.5. Fewer strong 
free-riders are punished, and they exhibit a weaker increase in contributions after being punished. 
  Margreiter et al (2005) study voting in a common pool resource game, with players with heterogeneous 
contribution costs. Players are asked to vote on proposals about the proportion of endowment each group 
member  contributes,  at  the  end  of  every  period.  If  a  certain  proposal  is  selected  by  majority  vote,  it  is 
automatically implemented in the next period. They find that compared to homogeneous groups, the number of 
distinct proposals is markedly larger in heterogeneous groups, but fewer agreements are reached by majority 
voting.    
  Reuben and Riedl (2009b) consider a version of the voluntary contributions game in which players’ initial 
endowment of income, maximum permissible contribution, and benefit from provision of the public good (the 
return a player receives from any individual’s contribution) differ, depending on the treatment. They include   In this paper, we consider whether two key results of Ertan et al (2009) apply to a setting in 
which heterogeneity of group members’ productivity, as expressed in the marginal-per-capita return 
of  their  contributions,  exists.  The  two  results  are  that  (1)  permitting  but  restricting  permissible 
punishment to below-average contributors yields the highest payoff among punishment institutions 
that  condition  on  deviations  from  average  contribution  level,  and  (2)  when  engaged  in  repeated 
opportunities to vote, groups converge to this punishment institution over time. In our experiment, as 
in  Ertan  et  al.,  individuals  vote  at  regular  intervals  on  whether  individuals  are  permitted  have 
punishment directed toward them. After a regime is selected, based on majority vote, it is in effect for 
that group for a fixed and known number of periods. As in the Ertan et al. study, we vary, as a 
treatment variable, the number of periods that the results of one vote are in effect. Studying different 
voting terms is a potentially important aspect of institutional design, and the effect of a punishment 
system could well depend on the length of time a system is locked in and not subject to change. 
       The parametric structure of our experimental environment follows Tan (2008). She studies a 
four-person voluntary contributions game with two types of agent. Two players have an MPCR of 
0.9, so that each token they contribute yields 0.9 tokens to all group members, and the other two 
players have an MPCR of 0.3. All agents are permitted to punish any other agent in any period. Tan 
finds that punishment is not very effective in increasing contributions among heterogeneous agents. 
In groups that achieve cooperation, high MPCR players punish low MPCR players frequently for 
their free-riding behavior. However, when controlling for the contribution level of the recipient of 
punishment, high MPCR players receive more punishment than those with low MPCR.  
       There  is  reason  to  believe  that  heterogeneity  of  MPCR  may  make  a  difference  in  which 
institutions emerge from the voting process. The different costs of contribution among players may 
inhibit the establishment of a contribution norm, and create differing beliefs among agents about the 
appropriate level of contribution that each type should make. This may make it more difficult to 
achieve consensus on which punishment system to implement and may lead to a conflict between 
different types of agent. Such conflicts may prove sustained and durable, with adverse long-term 
effects on contributions and welfare. Indeed, as described in section four, the principal results we 
obtain  are  the  following.  We  find  that,  consistent  with  Ertan  et  al.  (2009),  the  most  effective 
institution, in terms of contributions and earnings, is one that allows punishment of below-average 
contributors only, regardless of productivity type. However, unlike in the Ertan et al. environment, 
                                                                                                                                                       
treatments  with  and  without  punishment.  As  in  previous  studies,  they  find  that  punishment  increases 
contributions in all of their treatments. They argue that the norm that is established differs depending on the 
treatment.  In  treatments  with  unequal  contribution  ceilings,  the  norm  that  is  enforced  is  to  contribute  in 
proportion to one’s maximum possible contribution. In treatments with unequal marginal benefits from public 
good provision, the enforced norm is to contribute proportionally to the ratio of the marginal benefits.   
 groups often fail to enact this institution, especially when the votes are held relatively frequently. 
Under these conditions, groups typically establish inefficient regimes, and particularly common is a 
system  in  which  no  punishment  is  permitted.  No  group  ever  votes  to  enable  punishment  of  all 
individuals, regardless of their type or contribution level. Players are more likely to vote to allow 
punishment of below-average contributors and the type other than their own, and they attempt to 
escape from future penalty opportunities by disallowing punishment rules targeting their own type. 
For many groups, this behavior appears to create an insurmountable roadblock to the establishment of 
the appropriate institution. 
      The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the experiment and 
in Section 3, we advance several hypotheses about the performance of different punishment regimes. 
In Section 4, we present an analysis of the data. Finally, in Section 5, we make some concluding 
remarks.             
                    
2. The Experiment 
2.1 General Setting 
The experiment consisted of six sessions that were conducted at CentER Lab, at Tilburg University in 
the Netherlands. There were two treatments, the Short-Term and the Long-Term treatments. Each 
treatment was in effect in three of the sessions. Forty-eight subjects, among whom 42% were females, 
and all of whom were students at Tilburg University, participated in the study. Some of the subjects 
had previously participated in economic experiments, but all were inexperienced with the voluntary 
contributions mechanism. Each subject took part in only one session of the study. On average, a 
session lasted about 80 minutes (including initial instruction and payment of the subjects), and a 
subject  earned  an  average  of  454  tokens  (approximately  18.16  euros).  The  experiment  was 
programmed and conducted with the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). 
      Each session included eight participants that were separated into two groups of four. At the start 
of each session, the computer program randomly assigned the subjects into different groups according 
to their choices of terminal upon entering the room for the session. All individuals remained in the 
same group for their entire 30-period experimental session. All 30 periods of play counted toward 
final earnings, and there were no practice periods at the beginning of the sessions. At the beginning of 
each period, every player was randomly given an identification number from 1 to 4 to distinguish her 
actions from those of the others during that period. To prevent the formation of individual reputations, 
however, the numbers were randomly reallocated at the beginning of every period. 
      Productivity heterogeneity was generated by randomly assigning half of the group members a 
high MPCR of 0.9 (players of this type will be referred to as type A players) and the other half a low MPCR of  0.3 (type B  players). Participants  were informed  of  their type  at the  beginning  of  the 
session, and their types remained fixed for the duration of the session.
5 The instructions used in the 




      The 30 periods that made up each session were divided into three segments, as illustrated in 
figure 1. In the first segment, comprising periods 1 – 3, subjects played the voluntary contributions 
game without the possibility of punishment. In the second segment, consisting of periods 4 – 6, a 
second  stage  was  added  to  the  game  in  which  any  player  could  punish  any  other  player,  after 
observing all players’ contributions. In the third segment, which made up the remainder of the session 
(periods 7 -30), the punishment system in place depended on the outcome of a voting process. Voting 
took place every two periods in the Short-Term treatment, and every eight periods in the Long-Term 
treatment.  
  In each period of the first segment, the following occurred. Each subject was endowed with ten 
tokens, with a conversion rate of 25 tokens = 1 Euro. Subjects simultaneously and independently 
divided their endowment between a private account and a group account. The income of an individual 
equaled the number of tokens she put in her private account, plus .9 times the total contributions of 
type A players in her group, plus .3 times the total contribution of type B players in her group. That is, 
a player’s income in each period equaled 
(1)                                       10 0.9 0.3 ij ij A B
j A j B
I C C C
= =
= − + × + × ∑ ∑  
         where Cij is the contribution of the ith player of type j. This calculation was displayed on subject 
i’s computer screen together with the contributions and earnings of all group members at the end of 
each period.  
  In period 4 – 6, each period was made up of two stages. There was a second, punishment, stage 
subsequent to the contribution stage described above. In the second stage, subjects were given the 
opportunity to send points ranging from 0 to 10 to any group member. Every point that a particular 
subject sent to another reduced the sender’s earnings by one token and reduced the earnings of the 
recipient by two tokens. Thus, subject i’s income in each period equaled: 
(2)                                 10 0.9 0.3 2 ij ij A B ik ki
j A j B k i k i
I C C C P P
= = ≠ ≠
= − + × + × − − × ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  
                                                 
5 Neutral language was used in the experiment. Players with MPCR of 0.9 were referred to as "type A" and players with 
MPCR of 0.3 were "type B". Moreover, potentially biased terms such as “contribution” and “punishment” were avoided. 
For example, punishment was termed as "points that reduce another player's income". 
6 Due to page limit, the instruction is not included in this version. However, it is available online via the following link: 
http://center.uvt.nl/phd_stud/tan/research/.          Where  ik
k i
P
≠ ∑ was the sum of points subject i sent to all group members, and  ki
k i
P
≠ ∑ was the sum 
of points she received from all others. At the end of each period, the computer displayed the subject’s 
own type, the tokens she and all group members contributed, the total number of points she received 
and assigned to others, her income for the current period and how it was calculated. Subjects were not 
informed about how much punishment other individuals sent or received. 
       In the third segment of each session, periods 7 – 30, the following took place. Every two periods 
in the Short-Term treatment, as well as every eight periods in the Long-Term treatment, a voting stage 
occurred at the beginning of a period. During the voting stage, every subject was required to answer 
each of the following four questions by clicking a box that corresponded to either (a) yes, (b) no, or 
(c) no preference.
7 The four questions were the following:  
  I vote to allow a person’s earnings to be reduced if the person is a: 
      (1) Type A player assigning less than the average amount to group account. 
      (2) Type A player assigning more than the average amount to group account. 
      (3) Type B player assigning less than the average amount to group account. 
      (4) Type B player assigning more than the average amount to group account.  
         
      After all subjects gave their answers, the computer tabulated the votes. If the number of “Yes” 
votes on one of the questions exceeded the number of “No” votes, the reduction specified in the 
question was allowed; otherwise it was not. A “No preference” vote did not count towards the voting 
outcome.  Since  there  were  four  questions,  the  number  of  possible  outcomes,  or  punishment 
institutions,  was
4 2 16 = .  Subjects  were  informed  of  the  punishment  system  instituted,  and  the 
number of periods this institution would be in effect. In the Long-Term treatment, a vote occurred 
every eight periods, and the same institution remained in effect for the eight-period interval following 
the vote. In the Short-Term treatment, a vote took place every two periods, and the resulting system 
was in effect for the two periods. 
       
     
                                                 
 
7 Ertan et al. (2005) also included an option to vote to allow punishment of those players whose contributions were exactly 
equal to the average. This option is not included in this experiment, however, because if two more questions concerning 
average contributors of each type are included, the potential number of punishment systems would increase to 64.  
Figure 1: Timing of Activity in Each Treatment 
 
 
     
       In every period, regardless of whether a vote occurred in the current period, the contribution and 
punishment stages occurred in a similar manner as in the second segment. During the punishment 
stage, subjects decided how many points to send to members meeting the punishment requirement, 
but were required by the computer program to abide by the restrictions resulting from the last vote, 
whether it occurred in the current or in a prior period. The feedback presented to subjects at the end 
of a period in the third segment was the same as in the second segment.  
              
2.3 The Experiment of Tan (2008) 
Tan (2008), in a related study, examines the effect of an exogenously imposed punishment institution 
on players with heterogeneous productivity. A number of features of that study are similar to the one 
reported here. The parametric structure of the game is the same in the two studies. Players played the 
voluntary contributions game under a fixed matching protocol, with two high productivity players 
with an MPCR of 0.9, and two low productivity players with an MPCR of 0.3. In one treatment, no 
punishment  was  possible,  as  in  periods  1  –  3  in  the  study  reported  here.  In  another  treatment 
punishment of any other player was permitted, as in periods 4 – 6 here. 
  However, there are important differences between the two studies. In the Tan (2008) study, the 
punishment  system  is  imposed  exogenously  rather  than  enacted  endogenously  by  participants 
themselves. Furthermore, in the Tan experiment, the length of a session is 15 periods, and the same 
punishment condition remained in effect for the entire session. While it is not the principal purpose of 
the study reported here, the similar parametric structure between our experiment and Tan (2008) 
allows us to make rough comparisons between the two studies, and we do so with regard to aspects of 
individual behavior in section 4. 
                             3.  Hypotheses 
Our analysis is organized as a test of several hypotheses. The first two concern whether particular 
results obtained in Ertan et al. (2009) generalize to our environment. The first hypothesis is that the 
most effective system for promoting high welfare is to permit punishment of only below-average 
contributors, regardless of their productivity, a system we refer to hereafter as Pun-Low. The rationale 
for the hypothesis is that such a system enables the group to punish low contributors to influence their 
behavior, and prohibits punishment of high contributors in order to encourage them to continue their 
behavior. Pun-low was the most effective of all of the available systems in Ertan et al.’s (2009) 
environment. 
 
Hypothesis 1 (Efficient Punishment Regime Hypothesis): The most efficient punishment regime, in 
the sense of yielding the highest welfare, is to allow punishment of below-average contributors only, 
regardless of productivity (Pun-Low). 
 
     Ertan et al. observed that Pun-Low was reached consistently after several iterations of the voting 
process. We  consider  whether this  finding  carries  over to  our setting  with heterogeneous agents. 
While there is a powerful collective incentive to converge to the most efficient arrangement, there is 
also reason to believe that it may not do so in an environment with heterogeneous agents. The work 
of  Margreiter  et al. (2005) indicates that  voting does not  guarantee  that  an institution  with high 
contributions  and  welfare  emerges  when  contribution  costs  vary  among  group  members.  More 
generally, heterogeneity in MPCR leads to lower contributions (Fisher et al. 1995) even in settings in 
which punishment is possible (Tan, 2008), and this difficulty in cooperating may carry over to the 
institution formation phase. Nonetheless, as a null hypothesis we propose that the voting process will 
behave effectively in discovering the most efficient arrangement: 
 
Hypothesis 2 (Punishment Regime Convergence Hypothesis): Convergence to the most efficient rule 
occurs over the course of the voting process.  
 
      Note that either Hypotheses 1 or 2 may be supported while the other one is not supported. Pun-
Low may lead to the greatest level of welfare, but may not be attained with the voting process. An 
institution other than Pun-Low may generate the highest welfare and also be the outcome of the 
voting process.  The next hypothesis concerns the difference between treatments. A priori, the effect 
of lengthening the time that an institution is in effect on per-period welfare is ambiguous. On one 
hand, longer governance duration implies a greater commitment to the results of a given vote, and that may create greater incentives to form more effective institutions. On the other hand, the shorter 
governance  duration  in  the  Short-Term  treatment  offers  groups  more  opportunities  to  search  for 
effective institutions, and to discard ineffective ones, than does the Long-Term treatment. Since these 
two  effects  operate  in  different  directions
8,  we  hypothesize  that  the  contributions  made  and  the 
welfare attained are not different between the Short-Term and the Long-Term treatments.                                
 
Hypothesis  3 (Governance Duration Hypothesis): Contributions and welfare are not significantly 
different between the Short-Term and the Long-Term treatments. 
 
4. Results  
The first hypothesis concerns the relative performance of different institutional structures in terms of 
contributions and welfare. Table 1 displays the average group contributions and earnings under each 
institution across treatments. The table shows how many times each punishment system was enacted, 
how many periods it was in effect, the average contribution and welfare level (measured as subject 
earnings) it generated, and its rank among the systems in terms of contribution and welfare levels. 
Nine out of 16 possible combinations of punishment rules are enacted at least once in our dataset. The 
four most common combinations are: (1) to disallow punishment of any agent (which we will refer to 
as No-Pun), (2) to allow punishment of below-average contributors regardless of productivity (Pun-
Low), (3) to allow punishment of Type B players making below-average contributions (Pun-B-Low) 
and (4) to allow punishment of Type A players making below-average contributions (Pun-A-Low). 
These four structures account for almost 90% of the total voting outcomes. No group ever votes to 
permit  punishment  of  all  agents.  Result  1  summarizes  the  main  findings  concerning the relative 
performance of the institutions with regard to contributions and efficiency. 
 
RESULT 1: The efficient punishment regime hypothesis (Hypothesis 1) is supported. The most 
effective  regime,  in  terms  of  both  contributions  and  earnings,  is  Pun-Low,  which  allows 
punishment of players with below-average contributions only, regardless of productivity. This 
is the case in both the Short-Term and Long-Term treatments.  
  
SUPPORT: According to table 1, the four most successful institutions all allow punishment of at least 
some below-average contributors. Pun-Low is the most effective institution in terms of contributions 
                                                 
 
8 Ertan et al. (2005) also vary the length of time the results of a vote are in force, but do not discuss the effect of governance 
duration on outcomes. in both treatments, and in terms of welfare in the Short-Term treatment. In the Long-term treatment, 
Pun-Low is the second-ranked system of welfare after Pun-A-Low. Overall, in Pun-Low, the mean 
contribution level is almost three quarters of the total endowment, which is 73% more than the next 
best  system,  Pun-A-Low.    A  Mann-Whitney  rank-sum  test,  using  average  contributions  in  each 
session  for  the  periods  that  the  system  is  in  effect  as  the  unit  of  observation,  indicates  that 
contributions in Pun-Low are significantly greater than in Pun-A-Low (z = -2.364, p < 0.05) and than 
in Pun-B-Low (z = -2.030, p < 0.05). A similar result holds for welfare. Although welfare is not 
significantly greater in Pun-Low compared to Pun-A-Low (z = -0.447), it is significantly greater than 
under Pun-B-Low (z = -2.030, p < 0.05). □  



























Pun-Low  8  64  1  6.94  2  18.15 
Pun-A-Low  4  32  2  4.13  1  20.22 
Pun-B-Low  1  8  4  0.91  5  10.43 
No-Pun  3  24  5  0.22  4  10.29 
PunAL&PunBH  1  8  3  2.34  3  12.98 
PunAH&PunBL  1  8  6  0.28  6  9.66 
Pun-B-High  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
Pun-A-High  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
Pun-B  --  --  --  --  --  -- 
Total  18  144       
 
 




















Pun-Low  12  24  1  8.20  1  20.67 
Pun-A-Low  9  18  3  3.97  4  13.27 
Pun-B-Low  18  36  2  4.57  2  15.21 
No-Pun  25  50  7  0.41  7  10.50 
PunAL&PunBH  2  4  5  2.88  3  14.40 
PunAH&PunBL  1  2  4  3.63  6  11.03 
Pun-B-High  1  2  9  0.00  9  10.0 
Pun-A-High  3  6  6  2.00  5  12.3 
Pun-B  1  2  8  0.13  8  10.03 
Total  72  144        
       There are a number of other interesting patterns evident in the table. No-Pun is considerably less 
effective in generating contributions and earnings than the systems that allow punishment of below-
average contributors. There are also some differences in the incidence and relative performance of the 
institutions between treatments. Institutions permitting punishment of only above-average but not 
below-average  contributors  appear  only  in  the  Short-Term  treatment.  The  inefficient  No-Pun 
institution is in effect in more than twice as many periods in the Short-Term treatment than in the 
Long-Term treatment. The Pun-A-Low institution is more effective in the Long-Term treatment than 
in the Short-Term treatment both in terms of contribution and earnings, while the opposite holds for 
Pun-B-Low.   
        
                 Table 2. Average Group Contributions and Earnings as a 
Function of Punishment System in Effect             

















0.306            0.657  -4.979***  -9.434*** 
  (0.578)           (0.492)   (1.127)  (2.486) 
β2 Pun Low 
Contributors 
 2.733***        2.989***  1.978**  5.351** 
  (0.497)  (0.502)  (0.969)  (2.317) 
β3 Punish A Low 
Contributors  -1.780***  -0.535  -1.669  -1.448 
  (0.626)  (0.507)  (1.220)  (2.486) 
β 4 Punish B Low 
Contributors  -0.875  1.030**  -2.295  0.496 
  (0.826)  (0.451)  (1.615)  (2.134) 
β 5 No Punishment  -1.934**  -1.971***  -2.921*  -4.217** 
  (0.843)  (0.417)  (1.642)  (2.025) 
β0 Constant  4.062***  3.459***  16.704***  14.718*** 
  (0.411)  (0.339)  (0.801)  (1.171) 
Adjusted R squared  0.353  0.399  0.273  0.459 
Observations  164  166  164  166 
 
Notes: *10% significance; **5% significance, ***1% significance. Contribution data corresponding to infrequently enacted 
institutions such as PunAL&PunBH, PunAH&PunBL, PunAH, PunBH and PunB are excluded because of the insufficient 
number of observations. The model specification is a fixed effect model with the variable “group” as the individual effect. 
The standard errors are robust within group correlation. A Chow test rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficients of 
Long-Term and Short-Term treatments are equal. Therefore, we conduct a separate estimation for each treatment.  
   
  Table 2 reports the results of a regression estimating the effect of the different institutions on 
contribution  and  welfare  levels.  The  data  in  the  first  three  periods  of  the sessions,  in  which  no 
punishment regime is in effect, are the baseline of the regressions. Unrestricted punishment, in effect 
in periods 4 – 6 of each session, and in which players can reduce the earnings of any other player, 
does  not  lead  to  higher  contribution  levels,  but  does  lower  earnings,  in  both  treatments.  This  is 
indicated by the estimates for β1. The significantly positive β2 across all equations confirms the robust 
effect  of  allowing  for  punishment  of  below-average  contributors:  this  increases  group  average 
contribution levels and earnings relative to the baseline. The significantly negative coefficient β5 in 
indicates that if players vote out to disallow any form of punishment during the voting stage, group 
average  contributions  and  earnings  decrease  relative  to  a  situation  in  which  the  same  system  is 
imposed exogenously. 
       The second hypothesis concerned whether the most effective institutional structure emerges from 
the voting process. Our findings are summarized in result 2. 
 















RESULT  2:  Punishment  Regime  Convergence  Hypothesis  (Hypothesis  2)  is  not  supported. 
Institutional rules fail to converge to the efficient Pun-Low system in either treatment. 
 
SUPPORT: Figure 2 shows the incidence of each institution in each of the sequence of votes in the 
two treatments. The horizontal axis of the figures represents the timing of the vote, with voting time 
















































Pun-Low Pun-A-Low Pun-B-Low No-Punoccurs in period 9 in the Short-Term and in period 15 in the Long-Term treatment. The vertical axis 
represents the number of groups, out of a total of six groups, that choose each system. None of the six 
groups votes for Pun-Low during their last vote in the Short-Term treatment, while only three of the 
six groups do so in the Long-Term treatment.  
 
  As we can see from the data in the figures, the relatively efficient Pun-Low institution is chosen 
with greater frequency in the Long-Term treatment. However, the positive effect on welfare of the 
relatively frequent choice of Pun-Low in the Long-Term treatment is not sufficient to offset the even 
greater  increase in contributions  and  welfare that  occurs in those instances when  subjects in the 
Short-Term treatment select Pun-Low. Result 3 summarizes our findings.  
 
RESULT 3: The Governance Duration Hypothesis (Hypothesis 3) cannot be rejected. That is, 
we  cannot  reject  the  null  hypothesis  that  the  Short-Term  and  the  Long-Term  treatments 
generate equal contributions and equal welfare. 
 
SUPPORT:  Mann-Whitney rank sum tests of differences in contributions and welfare between the 
Short-Term and Long-Term treatment in periods 7 to 30, taking each group’s activity over those 24 
periods as a unit of observation, suggest that neither distributional difference is significant between 
the two treatments (z = 0.320 for contribution and 0.801 for earnings). □ 
 
  Figures 3a and 3b show the time series of earnings and punishment points assigned for each 
group, in the Long-Term and Short-Term treatments, respectively. The vertical axis indicates the per-
capita  earnings  in  tokens  (the  maximum  possible  is  24,  and  the  level  corresponding  to  zero 
contribution and zero punishment is 10), and the number of punishment points allocated per capita. 
The horizontal axis is the period number. Both figures show that, while Pun-Low performs better than 
the other systems on average in terms of earnings, it remains inconsistent and only reaches welfare 
levels close to the potential maximum in some instances. It is also clear that punishment is effective 
in raising contributions, at least in the short run; in almost every period after which any punishment 
points are assigned, there is an increase in group earnings. The No-Pun institution consistently leads 
to zero or near-zero contributions, as reflected in average earnings near ten tokens. In the Long-Term 
treatment, three groups achieve close to the maximum possible level of earnings, and they do so by 
enacting  Pun-Low  or  Pun-A-Low.  In  the  Short-Term  treatment,  institutional  changes  are  quite 
frequent with at least four changes, between one vote and the next, occurring in each group. Only two groups achieve close to maximal earnings by the end of their session. One does so by enacting Pun-
Low, and the other with Pun-B-Low.  
 
Figure 3a: Earnings and Punishment Levels in the Long-Term Treatment 
 
 
Notes: Each panel corresponds to one group in the treatment. The horizontal axis designates the number of periods, with the 
segments indicating the periods in which a specific institution is in effect. The names of the voted institutions are written in 
the upper part  of  each segment. The lines with crosses represent the  group average  earnings,  and the  lines with dots 
represent average sanction points. 
 
                            
 
  Figure 3b: Earnings and Punishment Levels in the Short-Term Treatment 
 
Notes (Cont’d): PL is short for “allowing punishment  of players with below  average contributions”; PAL  is short for 
“allowing punishment of type A players with below average contributions”; PBL is short for “allowing punishment of type 
B players with below average contributions”.  NP is short for “not allowing any form of punishment”. PB is short for 
“allowing  punishment  of  type  B  players.  PunAHBL  is  short  for  “allowing  punishment  of  type  A  with  above  average 
contributions or type B players with below average contributions”. PAH is short for “allowing punishment of type A players 
with above average contributions. 
 
  Figures 4a and 4b show the voting behavior of individuals based on their type and contribution 
level in the period immediately preceding the vote. Each panel in the figures corresponds to the votng 
behavior  of  one  four  types/contribution  profiles  in one  of  the  treatments.  Each  bar  indicates  the 
percentage voting in favor, voting against, and abstaining from each of the four punishment rules. The 
figures are constructed by classifying each player into one of the four categories: type A below-
average contributors (abbreviated to AL), type A above-average contributors (AH), type B below-
average  contributors  (BL)  and  type  B  above-average  contributors  (BH)  based  on  her  actual 
contribution one period before the voting stage. Then the number of “yes”, “no” and “no preference” 
votes are summed.  
          Figure 4a: Voting Patterns in the Long-Term Treatment, Percentage 
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Figure 4b: Voting Patterns in the Short-Term Treatment, Percentage of 
Players Voting to Punish Each Type and Contribution Level 
 
 
      
  
 
      The figures illustrate the sharp conflicts between above-and below-average contributors, as well 
as between type A and type B players. When above-average contributors vote in favor of punishment 
of below-average contributors, they are much more likely to vote in favor of punishment of the other 
type. Likewise, when they vote against allowing punishment of above-average contributors, they are 
more likely to vote in favor of banning this punishment for their own type. Below-(above-) average 
contributors are more willing to vote to allow punishment of above-(below-) average contributors  
than of players who contribute similarly to themselves.
9 These patterns suggest that players try to shut 
down punishment channels that may point to them in the future. 
                                                 
 












voteAL voteAH voteBL voteBH
Yes Abstain No












voteAL voteAH voteBL voteBH
Yes Abstain No












voteAL voteAH voteBL voteBH
Yes Abstain No












voteAL voteAH voteBL voteBH
Yes Abstain No 
Table 3. Voting Patterns 
               
      Dependent variable: Voting of player i in favor of permitting punishment of player k at time t,
t
ik V  
 
Notes: *10% significance; **5% significance, ***1% significance. Only “yes” votes and “no” votes arte included in the 
estimation; abstentions are excluded. A random effect probit model with observations clustered within group correlation is 
reported. The results of a random effect logit model and a fixed effect logit model are highly similar. 
 
 
        Consider the following probit regression.  
(3)     
0 1 2 3







V yourself opp MPCR low con
type typeA opp con pun rec pun sent
β β β β
β β β β β ε
= + + +
+ + + + + +
     
 
The dependent variable equals 1 if subject i votes to permit a specific punishment rule k in period t, 
and 0 otherwise. The first explanatory variable, yourself, is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the rule 
allows  punishment  of  a  player  with  the  same  type and  similar  contribution  behavior  as  player  i 
exhibited in period t-1. Opp_MPCR equals 1 if the voted item k refers to the other type of player, and 
                                                                                                                                                       
9 There is one exception. In the Long-Term treatment, AH players rather than AL players are more willing to allow for 
punishment of BH players: 43.5% of AH players vote to allow for punishment of BH players while only 30.8% of AL 
players vote to allow for punishment of BH players. 
 
  Long-Term Treatment  Short-Term Treatment 
β1 Yourself  -0.720*  0.182 
  (0.397)  (0.174) 
β2 Opposite MPCR  0.917***  1.259*** 
  (0.279)  (0.126) 
β3 Below Average Contributor  1.467***  0.968*** 
  (0.221)  (0.093) 
β4 Type i  1.017**  0.697*** 
  (0.406)  (0.217) 
β5 Type A Player  0.208  -0.151* 
  (0.203)  (0.091) 
β6 Opposite Contribution  0.252  0.526*** 
  (0.261)  (0.119) 
β7 Punishment Received at Period (t-1)  -0.007  -0.045 
  (0.073)  (0.033) 
β8 Punishment Sent at  Period (t-1)  0.051  0.010 
  (0.072)  (0.017) 
β0 Constant  -2.060***  -1.330*** 
  (0.489)  (0.219) 
Log-Likelihood  -123.72  -553.26 
Observations  268  1098 Opp_con is analogous for the opposite contribution level relative to the average. Low_con equals 1 if 
the voted item refers to someone making a below-average contribution. Typei is also a dummy equal 
to 1 if the player voting is a type A player, whereas TypeA equals to 1 if the voted rule targets type A 
players. Pun_rec and Pun_sent are continuous variables representing the total number of punishment 
points received from other players and sent to other players, respectively, in the period immediately 
preceding each vote. Result 4 summarizes the findings. 
 
RESULT  4:  (Voting  Behavior)  In  both  treatments,  the  willingness  of  players  to  vote  on 
punishment of a certain player is greater (i) if the punishment rule refers to the opposite MPCR, 
(ii) if the rule refers to below-average contributors, and (iii) if the voter has a high MPCR. 
 
SUPPORT:  The estimates in table 3 show highly significant positive coefficients of β2, β3, and β4. 
This indicates that players are more willing to vote in favor of a punishment rule if it targets the 
opposite productivity type (β2), below-average contributors (β3), and if the player voting has a high 
productivity level (β4). □ 
  
Previous  research  indicates  that  the  number  of  punishment  points  one  individual  assigns  to 
another is influenced by the difference in contribution between the punishing and the punished agent, 
as well as the difference between the negative deviations of the recipient’s contribution from the 
group average level (Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Masclet et al., 2003; and Falk et al., 2005). Consider 
the following regression equation, whose estimates are given in table 4. 
 
(4)     { } ( ) { } ( )
{ } ( ) { } ( )
0 1 2
3 4 5 6
max 0, max 0,
max 0, max 0,
ik
t t t t t
i k k i
t t t t t
k k i k ik
P c c c c
c c c c type type
β β β
β β β β ε
= + − + −
+ − + − + + +
 
where  1 i type =  if the punisher i has an MPCR of 0.9;  1 k type =  if the punished k has an MPCR of 
0.9, and 
_
t c is the average contribution within the group in period t. Because of the large number of 
zero  values  for  the  dependent  variable,  we  estimate  this  specification  with  a  Tobit  model.  The  
standard errors take into account within-group correlation.  
       Empirical  evidence  also  shows  that  low  contributors  on  average  respond  to  punishment  by 
raising their contributions in the subsequent period (Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Masclet et al, 2003). The 
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where  1 i type =  if i is a high-productivity player. β1 measures the effect of the total number of points 
subject i receives on her change in contribution from one period to the next, and β2 is the effect of the 
difference between individual i’s contribution and her group average contribution level in period t. β3 
measures any difference in overall contribution change between the two types, and β4 registers a 
differential response to punishment on the part of high and low productivity types. The estimates of 
models  (4)  and  (5),  for  the  data  from  the  exogenously-imposed  unrestricted  punishment  system 
studied in Tan (2008), are also included in tables 4 and 5 under the column labeled Unrestricted 
Punishment. In table 5, only the observations in which an individual’s contribution in period t is 
lower than his group’s average for the period are included. Result 5 summarizes the main findings 
from the estimation of (4) and (5). 
            Table 4. Determinants of Sanctioning Behavior under Pun-Low 
 
                         Dependent Variable: Punishment points player i sends to player k at time t:
t
















(1.975)  (0.630)  (0.803) 
0.546**  0.752***  1.769***  β1 Negative Deviation from i’s Own 
Contribution 
{ } ( ) k i c c − , 0 max   (0.259)  (0.130)  (0.671) 
0.078  1.144***  --  β2 Positive Deviation from i’s Own 
Contribution 
{ } ( ) i k c c − , 0 max   (0.223)  (0.423)  -- 
0.799**  -0.201  -1.346  β3 Negative Deviation from Average 
{ } ( ) k c c− , 0 max   (0.352)  (0.199)  (0.862) 
-0.162  --  --  β4 Positive Deviation from Average 
{ } ( ) c ck − , 0 max   (0.242)  --  -- 
-0.497  -0.325  0.431 
β5 Type i 
(1.096)  (0.529)  (0.673) 
0.787*  -0.268  0.084 
β6 Type k 
(0.475)  (0.533)  (0.669) 
Log-Likelihood  -744.01  -277.957  -75.205 
Observations  1080  278  99 
 
Notes: *10% significance; **5% significance, ***1% significance. Only the observations of individuals who could 
potentially be punished are included.  Since the earnings of above-average contributors are not allowed to be reduced, the β4 
coefficient is not included in the Pun-Low estimation. 
 
Table 5. Subsequent changes in Contributions of Below-average 
Contributors as a Function of Punishment Received and Type 
               
                                     Dependent variable: changes of contribution 
1 t t
i i C C











β1 Punishment Received at Period t  0.289***  0.185 
  (0.067)  (0.162) 
β2 Deviation from average   0.169***  0.512** 
  (0.056)  (0.205) 
β 3 Type i  0.058  0.314 
  (0.401)  (0.805) 
β4  Punishment Received * Type i  0.340***  0.304 
  (0.127)  (0.202) 
β0 Constant  0.891***  -0.886 
  (0.258)  (0.603) 
Adjusted R squared  0.250  0.324 
Observations  161  66 
 
Notes: *10% significance; **5% significance, ***1% significance. The model specification procedure is as follows. Firstly, 
for Pun-Low institution, a Chow-breaking point test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the contribution responses of the 
Long-Term treatment and Short-Term treatment are the statistically equivalent (F (3, 58) = 0.93, p=0.432). Therefore we 
only report one result by combining two treatments together. We then compare a pooled OLS with robust standard errors; a 
fixed effect model and a random effect model. The pooled OLS proves to be the best specification through a Language-
Multiplier test  comparing with the random  effect  model and  an F-test with a fixed  effect  model.  For the  unrestricted 




RESULT  5:  (Punishment  Behavior  and  Responses)  Under  Pun-Low,  the  level  of  monetary 
sanction is increasing in the negative difference between the contributions of the recipient and 
the punisher in both treatments. Players increase their contributions more in the subsequent 
period, the  farther  their  contribution  is  below  the  group  average.  The  two  types  of  player 
respond similarly to the receipt of punishment.   
SUPPORT: The estimates in table 4 show that in both Pun-Low and the unrestricted punishment 
regime, there is a positive relation between the punishment points player i sends to player k and the 
extent to which player k’s contribution below that of player i’s. Unlike under unrestricted punishment, 
there is no relationship between the type of either the sanctioner or the sanctioned party in terms of 
punishment behavior. Table 5 indicates that in the Pun-Low regime, the contribution level increases 
significantly, the more a player’s contribution is below group average (β2). The insignificance of the 
β1 coefficient suggests that it is not the actual sanction that, but rather the possibility of punishment, 
which triggers increases in contribution when punishment of below-average contributors in enabled. 
The significant β4 coefficient in the Unrestricted Punishment data indicates that type A players are 
more likely to increase their contribution in response to punishment than type B players. However, 
this difference between types is not observed under Pun-Low. □ 
 
5. Conclusion 
  We have studied the voting behavior of groups that face a social dilemma. At regular intervals, 
the groups vote to select a punishment institution, a set of conditions under which individuals may 
punish others. The issue we investigate is whether the most efficient institution, in terms of yielding 
maximal  gains  to  the  group,  emerges  from  the  voting  process.  We  pose  this  question  for  an 
environment in which players are heterogeneous in terms of the benefit that their contributions yield 
to the group.      
  It  is  clear  which  institutions  promote  high  levels  of  contributions  and  welfare.  These  are 
institutions that allow punishment of low contributors. In particular, we observe that Pun-Low, which 
allows  punishment  of  low  contributors  regardless  of  type,  while  immunizing  high  contributors, 
performs well in generating high average contributions and welfare levels. This extends a previous 
result obtained by Ertan et al. (2009) in a similar setting with symmetric players, to an environment 
with asymmetric players. When the Pun-Low system is in place, little punishment is actually applied. 
The threat of punishment is typically sufficient to generate high levels of cooperation at a low cost of 
enforcement. 
  However,  we  find  that  groups  often  fail  to  adopt  this  institution  even  after  having  repeated 
opportunities  to  vote  for  its  enactment.  The  heterogeneity  of  players  and  the  ability  to  vote  to 
selectively punish individuals by type as well as by behavior appears to lead to negative consequences. 
It generates conflicts as players attempt to prevent punishment that can be directed at themselves, 
while attempting to enable punishment on players who differ in both contribution behavior and type. 
The result is that, because majority support is required to enact a punishment rule, groups often find themselves  with  no  ability  to  punish  some  or  all  free  riders,  and  thus  without  a  mechanism  for 
enforcing high contributions. Furthermore, in a setting with asymmetries, this type of conflict may be 
exacerbated  by  disagreement  between  players  of  different  types  on  the  appropriate  norm  of 
contribution, and thus on the appropriate punishment rule. When a punishment rule must be enacted 
with a majority vote, this disagreement appears to propagate back to the time of voting, and voters 
seek  to  protect  themselves  from  the  possibility  of  receiving  punishment  that  they  view  as 
inappropriate.  
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